By Nkechi Eze
Nigeria has been ranked among countries facing a high to critical risk of corruption in its defence and security sectors, according to the 2025 Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) released by Transparency International Defence & Security in collaboration with the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre and Transparency International Nigeria.
The report, published on March 19, 2026, paints a troubling picture of Nigeria’s defence governance, revealing that despite its role as a key regional security actor and a major recipient of international security assistance, the country continues to grapple with deep-rooted corruption risks across critical areas of its military and security architecture.
According to the Executive Director of CISLAC/TI-Nigeria, Auwal Ibrahim Musa, widespread insecurity across the country, including insurgency in the North-East, banditry in the North-West, and farmer-herder conflicts in the Middle Belt, continues to strain state authority and weaken public institutions. He noted that while there have been incremental reforms suggesting a formal commitment to improving defence governance, progress remains uneven and undermined by systemic challenges.
The report highlights that civilian oversight of the armed forces is constrained by weak enforcement mechanisms, outdated and sometimes contradictory legal frameworks, inadequate technical capacity, limited transparency, and persistent allegations of human rights violations during security operations. These structural deficiencies, it noted, are particularly evident in defence procurement processes, financial management systems, and operational accountability frameworks.
Transparency International’s findings indicate that corruption risks are deeply embedded across Nigeria’s defence sector, driven by weak short- and long-term oversight from defence committees and limited engagement from both internal and external audit institutions. Financial scrutiny, in particular, remains fragile, with significant gaps in transparency around defence spending, the use of secret expenditures, and the operations of military-owned enterprises. Although anti-bribery laws exist, their enforcement is inconsistent, while personnel management processes lack objectivity and operational risk management and procurement practices remain weak despite existing legal provisions acknowledging corruption risks.
Speaking on the broader implications of the findings, the Director of Transparency International Defence and Security, Francesca Grandi, warned that corruption is still not treated as a core operational risk within military doctrines globally. “Of the 17 countries we assessed, not one has military doctrine that treats corruption as an operational risk. That is a critical gap. When troops deploy without anti-corruption safeguards, the consequences are paid by the civilians they are supposed to protect, through extortion, abuse, and the erosion of local trust that insurgencies exploit. Governments and their partners cannot continue treating this as a second-order problem. It is a protection failure, and rising defence budgets will compound it,” she said.
The 2025 GDI assessed 17 countries across Sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria, measuring corruption risks across financial, operational, procurement, personnel, and political categories. Nigeria recorded a “very high” overall risk rating, with particularly alarming scores in key areas. Financial risk was rated at 16 out of 100, classified as critical under Band F, while operational risk scored 12 out of 100, also falling within the critical Band F category. Procurement risk stood at 23 out of 100, categorized as very high under Band E, while personnel risk was assessed at 50 out of 100, placing it at a moderate level under Band C. Political risk was rated at 37 out of 100, indicating a high level of risk under Band D.
In the political risk category, the report acknowledged that while Nigeria’s National Assembly possesses formal powers to scrutinise defence policy and spending through hearings, summoning of defence officials, and budget approvals, the effectiveness of these mechanisms remains limited. Defence committees in both chambers, alongside the constitutionally mandated Auditor-General, provide a framework for oversight, but in practice, these structures are weakened by capacity gaps, frequent turnover of committee members, conflicts of interest, and patronage-driven appointments. The report further noted that audit processes are undermined by delays in the publication of reports, outdated legal provisions, weak follow-up on findings, and chronic underfunding, leaving Parliament unable to sustain proactive oversight.
Financial risks were described as critical, with large portions of defence and security spending shielded from public scrutiny through the extensive use of classification, security votes, and off-budget mechanisms. Actual expenditure figures are rarely disclosed, and defence-linked commercial enterprises operate with minimal transparency or audit oversight. Although access-to-information laws exist, they are frequently overridden by broad security exemptions and conflicting secrecy legislation, effectively limiting public, media, and civil society access to defence financial data. While the country publishes its defence budget and submits it to the National Assembly within constitutional timelines, these disclosures focus primarily on planned allocations rather than actual spending, and supplementary budgets and classified expenditures receive little scrutiny.
On personnel risks, the report observed that Nigeria’s military disciplinary system shows signs of activity but remains inconsistent. Between 2019 and 2023, hundreds of personnel, including senior officers, were subjected to court-martial for offences such as abuse of office and procurement-related corruption, while more routine disciplinary cases, including dismissals for theft at strategic facilities like the Dangote Refinery, have also been recorded. Despite the existence of codes of conduct and asset declaration requirements for both military and civilian personnel, compliance remains significantly low. Whistleblowing mechanisms were described as high-risk due to weak protections, lack of trust, and fears of retaliation, while transparency in personnel data remains limited, with ongoing concerns about ghost workers and opaque promotion processes, particularly at senior levels.
Operational risks were identified as the weakest aspect of Nigeria’s defence governance, with the report stressing the absence of a clear doctrine that treats corruption as a strategic risk in military planning and deployment. Anti-corruption considerations are not systematically integrated into operational frameworks, and there is little evidence that commanders consistently apply corruption-risk awareness in the field. Training on corruption risks remains limited, despite recurring cases involving diversion of operational funds, procurement fraud, and the use of substandard equipment affecting troop safety. Monitoring mechanisms are described as irregular and lacking specialised expertise, while there are no dedicated guidelines addressing corruption risks in contracting during deployments or peacekeeping missions. Oversight of private military contractors and external security providers is also minimal, leaving operations highly vulnerable to corruption and weakening overall effectiveness. The report further noted that since 2020, major defence procurements linked to operations against Boko Haram, banditry, and other internal threats have been conducted with limited public disclosure.
In the procurement category, Nigeria was assessed as facing very high corruption risks, driven by pervasive secrecy, broad legal exemptions, and weak external oversight. Although procurement is formally governed by the Public Procurement Act of 2007 and integrated into Ministry of Defence planning, most defence acquisitions are classified on national security grounds, limiting transparency throughout the procurement cycle from needs assessment to contract execution and asset disposal. Open competitive bidding is rare, with direct sourcing widely used, particularly during counter-insurgency operations. While oversight bodies such as parliamentary committees, the Bureau of Public Procurement, audit institutions, and anti-corruption agencies exist in law, their effectiveness is constrained by limited access to information and weak enforcement capacity. The report acknowledged that legal provisions criminalising procurement fraud and mandating civil society participation exist, but noted that these safeguards are largely ineffective in practice due to entrenched secrecy and weak audit enforcement.
Beyond Nigeria, the report identified broader regional challenges, noting significant shortcomings in oversight, transparency, and civic space across the 17 countries assessed. While oversight institutions exist in most cases, they often operate with limited authority, with executive dominance constraining parliamentary scrutiny and restricted access to information hindering effective audits. The report revealed that 76 percent of assessed countries have very weak or non-existent civic space, limiting civil society participation in defence policy discussions and weakening accountability mechanisms.
The report concluded with a stark warning that without stronger oversight frameworks, improved transparency, and meaningful inclusion of civil society, corruption within the defence sector will continue to undermine security efforts and divert critical public resources away from those most in need.
