By Abubakar Jimoh
It is no more news that Nigeria’s defence and security sectors are plagued with systemic corruption, a major hindrance to the effective provision of defence in a country facing serious security challenges.
While Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, faces diverse corruption-induced security and financial issues, the ongoing corruption, fraud, financial mismanagement, and wider abuse of power within the defence and security sector have exacerbated Nigeria’s numerous security threats and threatened the country’s ability to mitigate escalating violent conflict within its borders. These unattended challenges largely manifest as the failure of state security forces to protect local populations from terrorist violence with resultant proliferation of self-defence militias and the militarisation of local communities.
Corruption-induced insecurity that lingers in various parts of the country with widespread killings and kidnapping for ransoms by insurgents, bandits and other armed opposition groups, has drawn attention and pressure from the international community threatening inversion or sanctions against Nigeria.
Studies have identified corruption as an issue affecting Nigerian public finances, business investment, and standard of living. The decades-long struggle with systemic corruption places Nigeria at 145th place out of 180 countries in the 2023 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI), with minimal score changes over the lifetime of the index. Similarly, Nigeria’s 2024 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score is 26 out of 100, placing it at 140th out of 180 countries. This indicates that Nigeria is perceived to have a high level of corruption in its public sector.
CISLAC has also highlighted issues around personnel management in the armed forces, including faulty recruitment processes, inadequate human resources, and decentralised remuneration systems and structures. These reported irregularities in recruitment, appointment, deployment, remuneration and promotion across defence and security institutions pave the way for corruption.
The Nigerian state is also confronted with violent security threats. The country faces intense proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In 2021, it was estimated that Nigeria domiciled roughly 70% of illicit arms and weapons in West Africa. This has heightened insecurity, contributing to a nationwide rise in kidnapping, banditry, sexual and gender-based violence, killings, and other security issues. The north-eastern part of the country, which is an epicentre of terrorism in Nigeria, faces dire realities, owing to socio-economic insecurity.
As observed in a a policy brief titled “Nigeria’s Defence Sector: Persistent Corruption Risk amidst Escalating Security Threats” published by Transparency International Defence and Security Programme in collaboration with CISLAC/TI-Nigeria, there are also reports of desertion and allegations of corruption in the supply of armaments and safety gear, placing military personnel in danger whilst on the front lines.
The impact of defence procurement-related corruption extends well beyond the confines of the sector. Because of its impressive oil production capability, a fiscal account was created in 2004 by the Nigerian government to save revenues generated from the sale of oil that were in excess of the budgetary benchmark price. While the aim of this Excess Crude Account (ECA) was to protect planned budgets against shortfalls due to fluctuations in oil prices, under the Buhari government, in power from 2015 to 2023, the Excess Crude Account fell from a high of US$2.1 billion in 2015 to a shocking US$376,000 in 2022. This was due to the fact that withdrawals were made with no transparency on allocation nor oversight. For instance, in December 2017, US$1 billion was said to have been withdrawn from this account. Of the US$1 billion, US$500 million was used to pay the US for 12 A-29s Super Tucano aircraft and the remaining US$500 million was unaccounted for and used in the remaining “security vote”.
Just as financial management of the defence sector is severely constrained by the bypassing of existing, albeit limited rules, with the effect of institutionalising informal practices for the benefit of individuals rather than human security.
Moreover, GDI data shows that external auditing of defence institutions is compromised by a lack of access to information and cooperation by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which regularly refuses to submit documents in a timely fashion and bars auditors’ access to accounts. Furthermore, the existing legal provisions in the Nigerian Audit Act are outdated; thus, rendering the Office of the Auditor General for the Nigerian Federation operationally incapable of scrutinising the financial management of the sector.
CISLAC in collaboration with TI-DSP has obsevered that inadequate technical expertise of some members of relevant defence and security committees in the National Assembly constitute a major barrier to the effective civilian oversight. This leaves the financial and operational management of the sector fully exposed to corruption risk and opaque practices.
Moreover, GDI data shows that external auditing of defence institutions is compromised by a lack of access to information and cooperation by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which regularly refuses to submit documents in a timely fashion and bars auditors’ access to accounts. Furthermore, the existing legal provisions in the Nigerian Audit Act are outdated; thus, rendering the Office of the Auditor General for the Nigerian Federation operationally incapable of scrutinising the financial management of the sector.
In partnership with TI-DS with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Netherlands, we demand continued support to national and sub-national stakeholder platforms that engage with the Nigerian government on key issues related to defence and corruption. This will allow civil society actors and the media to provide input into national security strategy discussions and implementing policies.
We call for the adoption of an internationally accepted range of exceptions for defence and security that can be used in the development of legal frameworks, specifically in the right to information (RTI) law or information classification systems. This is also important for regulations governing procurement transparency and budget transparency.
We demand adoption of global principles and standards for public disclosure of critical information about the defence sector, including defence budgets, competitive contracting, defence income and foreign assistance, disaggregated expenditures, and asset disposals.
We also demand establishing guidelines for separating confidential from non-confidential information, similar to the Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information – The Tshwane Principles, would help limit abuses by setting out what information on budgets and procurements could be disclosed. For genuinely confidential procurements, a separate legal procedure could be designed allowing for monitoring by a confidential senate committee and a unit with suitable security clearance within the Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP).
Immediate amendment to the Audit Act by the National Assembly, has become imperative to address current trends and challenges, while enhancing the effective functioning of the Office of Auditor General of the Federation to fully interrogate financial management in the Defence and Security sectors.
We call for immediate harmonisation of legal and policy frameworks governing defence and security, both through independent analysis and via platforms for direct engagement with government actors. This is particularly relevant for freedom of information and whistleblowing and for public procurement processes and national strategy and policy development. Procurement transparency and oversight; In particular, reviewing the legal exemptions in Section 15 of the Public Procurement Law for military and defence purchases and recommending changes that enhance transparency and accountability.
Abubakar Jimoh is the Program Manager (Peace, Security and Human Rights) at Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)/Transparency International in Nigeria (TI-Nigeria)
Email: a.jimoh@cislac.org; and abujimoh01@gmail.com
